Context: On January 20, 2017, President Donald Trump penned his first executive order, which aimed to "minimiz[e] the economic burden" of the Affordable Care Act, signaling his intent to make good on promises to repeal and replace the law. This executive order, along with concurrent changes in political messaging associated with the transition in power and reductions in HealthCare .gov advertising, lowered Health Insurance Marketplace enrollment at the end of the 2017 open enrollment period. Methods: The authors used difference-in-differences and event-study models with weekly countylevel Marketplace application data from 1,476 counties in 37 states to estimate the incremental enrollment loss in the postinauguration period. Findings: Estimates indicate a population-weighted decline of over 700 applications per countyweek during the final 2 weeks of the 2017 open enrollment period relative to 2016, corresponding to a nearly 30% decline in applications submitted. A more flexible event-study approach that better accounts for time shifting of enrollment across open enrollment periods found a similar decline of approximately 660 applications per county-week associated with the postinauguration period (-24%). Conclusions: The lack of political support for the law by the incoming administration seemingly had an immediate and significant downward effect on Marketplace enrollment nationwide.
years of Marketplace operation and outreach (Gitterman and Scott 2011; Housten et al. 2016; Kodjak 2017; Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013) .
Despite no substantive changes in Marketplace operations and plan offerings (because open enrollment had begun before Election Day), changes in political messaging associated with a transition in power seemed to directly affect enrollment. Headlines sought to attribute the falloff in enrollment to Trump, largely based on observed drops in total enrollment and enrollment during the final weeks following inauguration (Goodnough and Pear 2017; Jost 2017b; Sanger-Katz 2017) . These articles provided qualitative context and aggregate statistics from national and state data but fell short in providing a plausibly causal attribution of how much of the decline in enrollment was a result of political upheaval and messaging versus other factors. No one has as of yet used county-level enrollment data to account for changes in plan availability and pricing plus differential year-over-year trends in enrollment prior to the inauguration timeframe (late January) in a rigorous causal analysis of changes in enrollment.
In this study we used both publicly available state-level Marketplace enrollment and nonpublic county-level application data to estimate the incremental enrollment loss in the postinauguration period using differencein-differences and event-study approaches. We also delved further into whether enrollment time-shifted across years and whether the ideological leanings of a county were associated with year-over-year changes in enrollment patterns, providing greater insight into potential mechanisms.
Methods
We used press release and enrollment reports from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to obtain state-level enrollment totals (count of plan selections) for those states enrolling through HealthCare .gov-federally facilitated marketplaces, state-partnership marketplaces, and state-based marketplaces-federal platform (SBM-FP)-for the week ending closest to January 15 inclusive and at the end of open enrollment for both the 2016 and 2017 open enrollment periods. We supplemented this where possible with data obtained from state-based marketplaces (SBM) via personal communications. This yielded data for 39 states, but we chose to drop Kentucky and Louisiana. Kentucky was excluded because it switched from being an SBM in 2016, branded as kynect, to a SBM-FP in 2017. Louisiana was excluded because it adopted Medicaid expansion as of July 1, 2016, changing the enrollment landscape and perhaps also awareness of the Marketplace and HealthCare.gov in the state across years. Medicaid expansion captures the lower end of the income distribution for Marketplace subsidies (100-138% of the federal poverty level) and tends to create a halo effect for enrollment by encouraging more people to look into eligibility for financial assistance in obtaining coverage.
We also obtained weekly county-level Marketplace enrollment data (count of applications submitted) from CMS via a Freedom of Information Act request. Of 2,685 counties represented in the raw data, 1,525 had complete data over the 28-week period covering the 2016 and 2017 open enrollment periods (November 1, 2015 , through February 6, 2016 , and October 30, 2016 , through February 4, 2017 . County-week cell sizes less than 11 were suppressed by CMS to protect enrollee confidentiality. We again dropped Kentucky and Louisiana for the reasons noted above, which yielded an initial analytic sample of 1,476 counties in 37 states.
Our analysis took place in two stages: a descriptive analysis of the statelevel enrollment data and a regression analysis of the county-level application data. For the descriptive analysis, we used the enrollment totals at each time point (January 15 and the end of open enrollment) to calculate the incremental enrollment during the final 2 weeks of open enrollment in each year by subtracting total plan selections at the end from those 2 weeks prior. We first used the incremental enrollment during the 2016 open enrollment period to calculate the expected percentage change in enrollment during the final 2 weeks in each state. Then, we multiplied the expected percentage change (increase) in enrollment during the final 2 weeks by the mid-January 2017 enrollment to estimate expected incremental enrollment in each state during the final 2 weeks of the 2017 open enrollment period. Finally, we used the difference between actual and expected incremental enrollment to estimate state and national enrollment declines in 2017 relative to the 2016 trend.
Importantly, this approach relies not on the actual enrollment totals (counts) but on the proportion of overall enrollment expected to occur during the final 2 weeks. For example, if 100,000 people enrolled in 2016 prior to the last 2 weeks and 5,000 enrolled in the final 2 weeks, we would estimate 5% incremental enrollment. We would then multiply whatever 2017 enrollment was prior to the last 2 weeks by 0.05 to estimate expected incremental enrollment for 2017. This allows us to account for any change in enrollment trends year over year leading up to that critical surge period at the end of open enrollment. It does not account for potential time shifting of enrollment within open enrollment, but we are able to address this in the regression analysis. This is an improvement on simple comparisons of the enrollment totals to establish a ballpark for the attributable effect on enrollment and helps triangulate the effect size, given that our regression analysis uses a slightly different outcome (applications submitted).
For the regression analysis, we used a linear regression model with county-week as the unit of analysis and number of applications submitted as the outcome. An application represents one or more potential enrollees, based on the size of the household and which members did not have other sources of coverage. Our panel includes 14 weeks of data across the 2016 and 2017 open enrollment periods (28 weeks in total) for 1,476 counties in 37 states. We used two estimation approaches: a more simplistic differencein-differences model and a more robust and flexible event-study model. For the difference-in-differences models, we used an indicator for the 2017 open enrollment period (treatment group), an indicator for the final 2 weeks of open enrollment (postperiod), and their interaction (treatment group · postperiod) as the basis for our difference-in-differences model. This interaction captures the differential effect of the inauguration of President Trump and his ACA executive order on application volume during the final 2 weeks of open enrollment in 2017. For the event-study models, we included an indicator for the 2017 open enrollment period (treatment group), a set of six indicators for each 2-week segment of the open enrollment period (weeks 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, 9 and 10, 11 and 12, and the last 2 weeks, with first 2 weeks omitted as the reference group), and the set of interactions between the 2017 indicator and each of the six 2-week segment indicators. Again, the interaction between 2017 and the last 2 weeks of open enrollment indicator represents our coefficient of interest.
We incorporated state-and county-level characteristics potentially associated with Marketplace activity, including state Medicaid expansion status (KFF 2019), 2010 county population and percentage of county population living in urban areas (US Census Bureau 2013), and the number of Marketplace insurance carriers, and we calculated the Silver gap (difference between benchmark Silver plan and the least expensive Silver plan for a single 40-year-old) by county and year (CMS 2016b, 2017b) and the percentage of votes received by President Trump in the 2016 presidential election in each county (Townhall 2017) . We also dichotomized presidential voting shares and ran stratified models by whether a majority of the county voted for Trump, looking for differential effects by ideological leaning. We weighted the models by county population to estimate a national average treatment effect on Marketplace enrollment. We also included county fixed effects in each model and clustered standard errors by county. Week (weeks 1-14 of open enrollment) fixed effects were Shafer and Anderson -The Trump Effect 719 included in the difference-in-differences models only. These analyses were conducted in Stata 15.1 (StataCorp LLC, College Station, TX). Figure 1 shows the state-level variation in enrollment year over year from 2016 to 2017. With the exception of a few states, changes in enrollment were generally small (-20%), with a fairly even distribution of gains and losses across states through January 15. In total, this corresponds to essentially no change in enrollment through mid-January during the 2017 open enrollment period versus the prior year (-1.0%).
Results
However, in looking at the year-over-year incremental enrollment through the end of the open enrollment period, large declines are prevalent. Figure 2 displays the adjusted drop in incremental enrollment (between January 15 and January 31, comparing 2017 and 2016) after adjusting for the state-level change in enrollment through mid-January during the 2017 open enrollment period. Maryland slightly outperformed its projected incremental enrollment, while all other states underperformed, ranging from -9.7% (Mississippi) to -93.9% (Montana) (not including three states with negative incremental enrollment in 2017, listed below). We found an overall decrease in enrollment of 52.5% during the last 2 weeks of the 2017 open enrollment in the 37 states using HealthCare.gov compared to 2016. This was robust to the removal of three states with negative enrollment growth between January 15 and January 31, 2017, due to differences in policies regarding plan effectuation and nonpayment (Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska), with an estimate of -50.3%. We observed only an 18.6% decrease in enrollment during the same period in two states with state-based marketplaces (Maryland and Minnesota) for which we were able to obtain data. The difference between projected and actual incremental enrollment in the HealthCare.gov states suggests that 403,013 fewer plan selections occurred on HealthCare.gov during the last 2 weeks of the 2017 open enrollment period compared with the same period in 2016. When adjusted for the observed declining trend in the two state-based marketplaces, this figure drops to 260,077 fewer plan selections. Figure 3 displays a map of county inclusion in our regression analysis, and table 1 compares included and excluded counties for enrollment, population, income, voting behavior, and uninsured rate. Though only 52% of counties using HealthCare.gov had complete data for the outcome and controls in our preferred model (model 2 in table 2), we capture 86% of population and 2016 enrollment for counties using the federal platform. Source: Authors' analysis of Marketplace enrollment data from CMS (2016a, 2017a) and statebased marketplaces (personal communications).
Notes: The bars represent the marketplace type in each state: federally facilitated marketplace (black), state-federal partnership marketplace (dark gray), state-based marketplace (medium gray), and state-based marketplace-federal platform (light gray). Because our difference-in-differences models do not allow for differential trends in weeks other than the last 2 weeks of open enrollment, we supplemented these models with an event-study approach that allows each 2-week segment of the 14-week open enrollment period to have a differential trend during the 2017 open enrollment period.
Our difference-in-differences models estimated a population-weighted decline of approximately 700 applications submitted per county-week during the last 2 weeks of open enrollment in 2017 relative to 2016 (table 2) . We ran two versions of the model. (1) All
(2) All In the models stratified by voting behavior (models 3 and 4), we found that minority-Trump-voting counties had much larger drops in numbers of application submissions during the postinauguration period relative to the year prior. However, this must be counterbalanced by lower likelihood of enrollment by Republicans than Democrats generally, larger price increases in Republican-dominated areas, and differences in population (Lerman, Sadin, and Trachtman 2017; Trachtman 2018) . On a percentage basis from the 2016 population-weighted average of application submissions by each set of counties, our results imply that application submissions in majority-Trump-voting counties (-32.5%) actually fell more than in minority-Trump-voting counties (-30.0%), which could reflect ideological opposition to the ACA.
Our event-study models estimated similar but smaller declines for the last 2 weeks of the 2017 open enrollment period relative to 2016 (table 3) (1) All
(2) All (1) All
(2) All 2017 open enrollment period relative to 2016. We also observed significant declines during the 2 weeks preceding the final 2 weeks of open enrollment for 2017, with similar declines as the final 2 weeks, indicating that there may have also been anticipatory changes in enrollment behavior related to public statements by the president-elect indicating that efforts to repeal and replace the ACA were imminent. The event-study estimates for the models stratified by voting behavior displayed the reverse relationship from the difference-in-differences estimates, with application submissions in minority-Trump-voting counties (-29.0%) falling by more than majority-Trump-voting counties (-19 .0%) in the postinauguration period relative to the prior year.
Discussion
The change in political support for the ACA by the incoming Trump administration, represented by both symbolic (i.e., executive order, public statements) and operational (i.e., reductions in HealthCare.gov advertising) actions, was associated with significantly lower enrollment during the postinauguration period in late January 2017. These findings add to our understanding that the ability for politics to undermine ACA program participation is growing, and to the evidence base showing that political actions and pronouncements can have real-world impacts on individual engagement with the Health Insurance Marketplace Gollust et al. 2018; Karaca-Mandic et al. 2017; Lerman, Sadin, and Trachtman 2017; Trachtman 2018) . Unfortunately, the postinauguration period was only the beginning of a tumultuous year for the ACA in terms of legislative efforts to repeal and replace it and administrative decisions that many argue were designed to help the Marketplace fail (Johnson 2017; Jost 2017a; Kliff 2017; Shafer et al. 2018; Stein 2017) . The anti-ACA political messaging has had two major impacts. The first is the obvious result that fewer people enroll in health insurance coverage through the Marketplace in the short run. These individuals are susceptible to catastrophic medical costs and delayed or foregone care, if affected by a serious illness or injury while uninsured (Aizer et al. 2014; Soni et al. 2018) . The second impact is an increase in premium levels going forward. Though enrollment losses may not cause a death spiral, worsening of the risk pool must obviously be counteracted with higher premiums over time (Fiedler 2017; Gaba 2017b) . The individual mandate, when fully enforced, would encourage younger and/or healthier individuals to enroll on the margin, improving the risk pool and lowering premiums for all (Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski 2015) . Insurers noted the uncertainty around the legislative and regulatory outlook for the ACA in pricing their Marketplace plans for 2018. They were caught off guard with abrupt change in the marketplace risk pool associated with lower enrollment for 2017, leading to compensating increases in 2018 for those insurers that remained in the market. Insurer rate filings for the 2018 plan year included concerns about enforcement of the individual mandate, for example, "increased risk and volatility" and "less stringent federal requirements" (Molina Healthcare of Texas 2017). Pennsylvania estimated that a full repeal of the individual mandate would lead to a 23.3% increase in premiums in the state (State of Pennsylvania 2017). The executive order only weakened enforcement, and did not fully repeal the mandate, but later congressional action would essentially repeal it. An estimated 12% of the roughly 30% national average increase in premiums for 2018 was attributable to "ongoing concerns about whether or not the Trump administration intends on enforcing the Individual Mandate" (Gaba 2017a) , which was subsequently zeroed out beginning in 2019 as part of a tax reform package passed by Congress.
This study assumes that 2017 would have generally looked like 2016 without the transition of power and its accompanying actions (executive order, changes in HealthCare.gov advertising, federal messaging, etc.), which seems reasonable given that the marketplace was stabilizing after insurer losses during the early years (Cox, Semanskee, and Levitt 2017) . The inclusion of two SBMs (Maryland and Minnesota), which control their own marketing and enrollment platforms, in the descriptive analysis reveals a significant deviation from the federally facilitated marketplace states, providing more confidence in the robustness of these findings. Minnesota operates a Basic Health Plan that enrolls individuals who earn between 138% and 200% of the federal poverty level, which is not sold on the Marketplace; this may make its potential enrollment pool notably different from that of other states. Overall, SBMs saw net gains in enrollment on average in 2017 relative to 2016 (Gaba 2017c; State of Connecticut 2017; Your Health Idaho 2017) .
CMS made improvements in reconciling plan cancellations with insurers and began including insurer-and consumer-initiated cancellations in its net totals of plan selections, a common measure of enrollment, before the 2016 open enrollment period, which affected the comparability of data with the 2015 open enrollment period (which we do not use). To the extent that further improvements were made for the 2017 open enrollment period, this may have placed downward pressure on enrollment figures; we therefore chose to use application submissions in our regression analyses rather than plan selections, to avoid potentially overstating the size of the effect.
It is also reasonable to believe that consumers were becoming more familiar with the enrollment process and that the surge in enrollment at the end of the open enrollment period may have been diminishing over time, which could also cause our estimates to overstate the true effect. However, our data do not support this as an alternative explanation for our findings. The proportion of total applications submitted in the last 2 calendar weeks during which enrollment was still open (not necessarily coinciding with the last 14 days of open enrollment) as a percentage of total applications actually increased from 7% for the 2014 and 2015 open enrollment periods to 13% for 2016 before dropping back to 10% for 2017. A similar pattern emerges if one looks at the raw totals, which rose from approximately 527,000 for 2014 to 638,000 for 2015 and 1,089,000 for 2016 before dropping back to 833,000 for 2017. This suggests that the last-minute surge was not diminishing over time and that the 2017 performance was in fact a sharp departure from the prevailing trend. This provides additional support to our decision not to use 2014 or 2015 open enrollment periods in our analysis, despite availability of data for both, as their timing and lengths also differed from 2016 and 2017, which would have necessitated a different analytic approach.
Our descriptive analysis is also limited by timing. The last preinauguration enrollment update in 2017 did not include January 15, while the comparable 2016 data did. January 15 is a particularly important day as it is the last day on which to select plans that would take effect on February 1. This limitation actually biases our estimates in favor of finding no difference in enrollment, despite the sizable differences that we observed. The difference-in-differences regression approach relies on the parallel trends assumption, though we believe this is plausible because the two study periods were the fourth and fifth open enrollment periods for the Marketplace and were the first two periods with identical starting and ending dates year over year. The event-study analysis adds flexibility in accounting for time shifting of enrollment across years and yields similar findings. Plan availability, benefit designs, and pricing were known quantities during the 2017 open enrollment period preinauguration, so there is plausible excludability of other factors causing these effects. We were not able to control for changes in advertising year over year or within each open enrollment period, though the only reports of advertising reductions for HealthCare .gov were for the final days of the 2017 open enrollment period (Pear 2017) . As such, we cannot disentangle the effect of the executive order from changes in political messaging or advertising for the ACA that took place postinauguration.
Our findings show that Marketplace enrollment can be highly vulnerable to changes in perceived political support, even after accounting for political composition of a county, which recent work has shown to be associated with marketplace plan pricing (Trachtman 2018) . We found inconclusive results for whether the magnitude of the drop was related to the political leanings of a county based on its voting results in the 2016 presidential election. Further research using individual-level data could help address whether certain demographic, economic, or ideological groups were less likely to enroll in coverage in response to the symbolic and operational actions taken by the incoming administration.
Despite no changes in plan availability and pricing, the transition of power to the Trump administration with its near coincident executive order, repeated public statements, and advertising reductions had an immediate and sizable impact on ACA enrollment activity postinauguration relative to the same period in 2016. This was only the beginning of the heightened turmoil surrounding the ACA; the lead-up to the 2018 open enrollment period was marred by a 90% cut in funding for advertising, large cuts to navigator support, and the cancellation of cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers, which caused insurers to raise premiums significantly (Gaba 2017a; Jost 2017a; Kliff 2017) . Though President Trump has argued that "Obamacare is imploding" (Trump 2017) , our findings suggest that the 2017 open enrollment period was on track for similar enrollment performance leading up to the week of inauguration. 
